Extract from a memorandum to Ribbentrop, on the need to acquire the Czech Sudeten territory by gradual steps, so as not to alarm Poland, France, and England about Germany's territorial ambitions

Berlin 26th August 1938 (signed) Pruefer.
To the Reichminister via the State Secretary.
MOST SECRET.
II
4. The most pressing problem of German policy, the Czech problem, might easily, but must not lead to a conflict with the Entente. Neither France nor England are looking for trouble regarding Czechoslovakia. Both would perhaps leave Czechoslovakia to herself, if she should, without direct foreign interference and through internal signs of disintegration, due to her own faults, suffer the fate she deserves. This process, however, would have to take place step by step and would have to lead
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to a loss of power in the remaining territory by means of a plebiscite and an annexation of territory.
The Czech problem is not yet politically acute enough for any immediate action, which the Entente would watch inactively, and not even if this action should come quickly and surprisingly. Germany cannot fix any definite time and this fruit could be plucked without too great a risk. She can only prepare the desired developments.
For this purpose the slogan emanating from England at present of the right for autonomy of the Sudeten-Germans, which we have intentionally not used up to now, is to be taken up gradually. The international conviction that the choice of nationality was being withheld from these Germans will do useful spadework, notwithstanding the fact that the chemical process of dissolution of the Czech form of states may or may not be finally speeded up by mechanical means as well. The fate of the actual body of Czechoslovakia, however, would not as yet be clearly decided by this: but would nevertheless be definitely sealed.
5. This method of approach towards Czechoslovakia is to be reco'mmended because of our relationship with Poland. It is unavoidable that the German departure from the problems of boundaries in the South East and their transfer to the East and North East must make the Poles sit up. The fact that after the liquidation of the Czech question, it will be generally assumed that Poland will be the next in turn.
But the later this assumption sinks in in international politics as a firm factor, the better. In this sense, however, it is important for the time being, to carry on the German policy, under the well known and proved slogans of "the right to autonomy" and "Racial unity". Anything else might be interpreted as pure imperialism on our part and create the resistance to our plan by the Entente at an earlier date and more energetically, than our forces could stand up to.