Extracts from Fuehrer conference minutes, on Hitler's suggestion to renounce the Geneva Convention, and Doenitz's disagreement

Admiral (Special duties) attached to C in C of the Navy Reg. No. 90/45 SO only
On active service 20.2.U5
SO only!
by officer courier only
Participation of the C in C Navy in Fuehrer's conference on the 19.2. at 1700 hours.
Note: The C in C Navy was not present at the Fuehrer's conference on 18.2.45. .
1. The Fuehrer is considering whether or not Germany should
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renounce the Geneva Convention. As not only the Russians but also the Western powers are violating International Law by their actions against the defenceless population and the residential districts of the towns, it appears expedient to adopt the same course in order to show the enemy that we are determined to fight with every means for our existence, and also through this measure to urge our people to resist to the utmost. The Fuehrer orders the C in C of the Navy to consider the pros and cons of their step and to report on this matter as soon as possible.
2. Chief of armed forces Operational Staff reports that information has been received on the supply of an enemy Army in the west, by transport gliders. In connection with this, the C in C Navy reports that according to a report of the submarine, stationed in the Hoofden, no large transports, but only smaller vessels like LST's and coastal vessels had been encountered in the convoy—route of Thames-Scheldt. Thus the suspicion arises that the enemy has withdrawn shipping from the Thames-Scheldt traffic, possibly having been sufficiently supplied there, in order to employ it in another place. In reply to a question by the Fuehrer, about his opinion on the possible place of redeployment' of enemy shipping, the C in C Navy states, that a clear picture of this situation does not exist, and requests air reconnaissance of Antwerp and the ports on the east coast of England at the earliest possible opportunity.
The Fuehrer passes this request on to the Reichs marshall.
The representative of the Reichsfuehrer SS in the Fuehrer's Headquarters, SS Major General Fegelein, transmits the Reichs-fuehrer's further inquiry as to when he can expect the arrival of the Panthers from Libau. The Fuehrer asks the C in C Navy, in addition to the foregoing question, as to when the infantry division departing from Libau would arrive. The C in C Navy explains, that all available shipping space had, according to requirements, been employed for transport problems, but that the question of what was loaded, and in what order individual organizations would be, was controlled by the army. The combat divisions must be given corresponding preference. This opinion is confirmed by the representative of the General Staff of the army (Lt. Col. GSC Hermani).
The Fuehrer adds, that in the long run one-sided preference for combat echelons was not possible, since these combat divisions could well dispense with their rear-echelon services such
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as (supply columns, work-drops etc.) for several days, but not for longer periods of time. Admira, (gpecIal dutiea)
[Signature illegible]
Distribution: Copy No. 1 Chief of Naval War Staff, Copy No. 2 1/SKL lb, Copy No. 3 Chief of Naval Defense, Copy No. 4 Chief of Naval Armament, Copy No. 5 Admiral at Fuehrer's Headquarters, Copy No. 6 Admiral' (Special duties).
On active service 21.2.1945.
Admiral (Special duties)
Attached to Ob.d.M.
Reg. Nr. 100/45 T0P SECRET
S. 0. only
Senior Officers only by officer courier!
Participation of C in C Navy in a Fuehrer Conference on 20.2.U5 at 1600 hours.
1. In the course of the conference on further operational decisions concerning the army's operations in the East, the Fuehrer asks that the C-in-C Navy explain the importance of the ports of Stettin and Swinemuende for our own Naval warfare. The C-in-C Navy explains that Stettin and Swinemuende form the backbone for the supply of the fleet in the eastern Baltic Sea. In case of their loss, troop and supply transports in the Baltic would be limited exclusively to the ports of the western Baltic. Due to the long shallow water-routes and the considerable danger of mines in this area, this means approximately a doubling of the time for these runs and especially also as the security units would be quite a bit more heavily taxed by this. Especially since Swinemuende is the decisive base for the Naval Forces in this area. Also its loss would seriously affect the fight against the Russians in the central and western Baltic. The deep water areas east of Bornholm would be lost for submarine training which is still being conducted there, so that the submarines would have to depend exclusively on the very shallow area of the western Baltic, which, for that reason, is little suited for training. The loss of the shipyards of Stettin and Swinemuende would mean the curtailment of the already very much reduced capacity for repairs; and finally there would be a strong concentration of naval forces in the western Baltic which would expose them still more to air attacks. In short, the holding of the Stettin area is of utmost importance for the conduct of naval
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warfare. The Fuehrer agrees with the explanations of the C-in-C Navy and makes his decisions for operational measures of the Armed Forces accordingly.
2. The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy informs the Chief of the Armed Forces Operational Staff [Chef WFSt] Col-General Jodi and the representative of the Reiehminister for Foreign Affairs at the Fuehrer's Headquarters, Ambassador Hewel, of his views with regard to Germany's possible renunciation of the Geneva convention. From' a military standpoint there are no grounds for this step as far as the conduct of the war at sea is concerned. Even the contrary, the disadvantages outweigh the advantages. Even from a general standpoint it appears to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy that this measure would bring no advantages. It would be better to carry out the measures considered necessary without announcement, and in any case to save face with the outer world.
The Chief of the Armed Forces Operational Staff [Chef WFSt] and Ambassador Hewel are in full agreement.
[Signature illegible]
Admiral (Special duties)
[illegible]
Distribution: Copy No. 1 Chief of Naval War Staff, Copy No. 2 1/SKL lb, Copy No. 3 Chief of Naval Defense, Copy No. 4 Chief of Naval Armament, Copy No. 5 Admiral at Fuehrer's Headquarters, Copy No. 6 Admiral (Special duties).