Cover note, record of German-Italian military conference on operations in North Africa and Albania, and summary of Hitler's speech on the war, including "an operation against Greece," the priority on attacking Britain, and vigilance regarding Russia

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Fuehrer HQ, 21 January 1941. Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
WFSt No. 8/Jfl Top Secret Top Secret!
Only thru Officer!
6 copies 2nd Copy
Enclosed please find a short resume of the speech made by the Fuehrer during the final conference with the Duce on 20 January 41, and a summary on the results of the conference held by the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces with General Guzzoni on the 19 January 41.
for the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
Jodi
—2 enclosures—
Distribution: OKH (GenStdH) 1st copy, OKM (Ski.) 2nd copy, Ob.D.L. (Iw.Fue.St. Ia) 3rd copy, OKW/WFSt 4th copy, L 5th copy, Aus. 6th copy.
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Enclosure 1 to OKW/WFSt No. 8/hi top secret
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6 copies, 2nd copy
Result on the Conference of the Chief of the Supreme Command
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of the Armed Forces with the Italian General Guzzoni on the 19 January
1. Important Items from the Appreciation of the Situation by General Guzzoni. 1. Albania: The most important Italian theatre of war. Though front not sufficiently secure to make it certain that the present line can be held against Greek attacks in all circumstances, no danger of Valona or Berat being lost. 21 divs. now in Albania. Intention is to send another 3 divs. from Italy. Intention to form a group for attack on the northern flank. Strength about 10 divs. (including 3 divs. still to be brought from Italy and 4 Alpine divs.) Will not be ready for attack before another 21/2 months, since transport facilities do not make it possible to ship the 3 divs. or the personnel and equipment required for the reinforcement of the remaining divs any faster. Intention to attack with this group in direction Korica, from there, some units to carry out a flanking movement to Erseke in order to cause the collapse of the northern part of the Greek front, the main body to continue the attack in the direction of Fiorina as soon as supplies are safeguarded beyond Korica (only 1 road available). Abandoned intention of making an attack with a limited objective along the coast in the near future.
2. Libya: Intention for continuation of campaign: Holding of Tobruk as long as possible. Defense of the Derna-Eastern edge of the Djebel line, using the armoured unit stationed at Mekili for offensive action. Sending of reinforcements from Tripoli to Cyre-naica in order to strengthen the defense planned there, in case the situation in Cyrenaica continues to develop favourably, thus making it possible to hold the western part of Cyrenaica. If Cyrenaica cannot be held, defense of Tripoli. Italians believe that Tobruk can hold out for some time and that British will not advance upon Benghazi-Agedabia before the fall of Tobruk. The following reinforcements are earmarked for Libya:—Bringing the 3 divs. stationed in Tripoli up to full strength, transferring 1 armoured div. and 1 infantry div. (motorized) from Italy to Tripoli. Completion of these transports about 20 February 41.
3. East Africa: Situation difficult in the case of British attack, which is expected in the near future. Defense to the utmost intended. It is desirable to divert British forces from Libya to East Africa, even though it may render the situation in East Africa more difficult.
4. Dodekanese: Expected attack on Dodekanese has not hitherto taken place. Supplies in hand for about 3 months. Forces in Do-
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dekanese weak [handwritten marginal note:—-these ought to be considerably increased], nevertheless a certain offensive power in the case of a German attack upon Greece from Bulgarian territory (especially against British transports from Egypt into the Aegean).
II. Views on the Italian Appreciation of the Situation: 1. Albania: Very unlikely that the Italians will be able to muster the forces required for an attack within the time provided. A support of a German attack from Bulgaria against Greece must therefore be discounted. [Handwritten marginal note:—the German attack will however bring strong relief to the Albanian front.]
2. Libya: Whether or not Cyrenaica can be held cannot yet be determined. Unless the situation is basically changed, a loss also of Tripoli need not be feared, all the more since from May onwards large-scale operations will no more be possible, owing to the heat. [Handwritten marginal notes:—the loss of Morzuk (S) is evidently considered trifling. Contitio sine qua non:—no complications out of Tunis.]
3. East Africa: Duration of resistance in the case of a British attack cannot be estimated.
4. Dodekanese: No resistance of any signifiance is to be expected in the case of attack.. Offensive action of the Italian forces stationed there against British transports to Greece cannot be counted on. [Handwritten marginal note:—ought to be built up in order to form an important complementary operation during the occupation of Greece.]
III. Employment of German Units in Libya and Albania: 1. Libya: Italians very warmly welcome the dispatch of the 5th light div. (motorized) composed as suggested. Shipment to Tripoli can begin approximately between 15 and 20 February; it will however be possible to carry out transports of equipment before that date.
2. Albania: Dispatch of a German unit is described by Italians as desirable, but not necessary. Dispatch of a corps impossible, as transport facilities inadequate. For reasons of transport dispatch of only one mountain div. with light equipment could be considered. Decision not urgent at the moment. Italian attack— unless strong Greek forces are moved from the Albanian front to the Bulgarian frontier—impossible in any case before the beginning of April, therefore German unit need not be sent before March. Consequently new decision whether a unit is to be sent, at the beginning of March. Preparations for making a unit available will however continue.
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Enclosure 2 to OKW/WFSt No. 8/4-1 top secret
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6 copies, 2nd copy
Speech by the Fuehrer on 20 January 1941
I. On 20 January at 1100 hrs., a report is made to the Fuehrer by the Chiefs of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces and of the Armed Forces Operational Staff in the presence of General von Rintelen on the result of the military discussions with General Guzzoni and General Gandin.
II. At 1200 hours, the Fuehrer developed before a wider circle his thoughts and views on the situation.
Those present:— on the German side
The Minister for Foreign Affairs Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Chief of the Armed Forces Operational Staff General von Rintelen Ambassador Schmidt An interpreter from the Foreign Office Colonel Schmundt Freg. Kapt. von Puttkamer on the Italian side the Duce Count Ciano General Guzzoni General Marras General Gandin
Contents of the Fuehrer's Speech in Concise Form
Finland of great importance to us owing to the nickel findings unique in Europe. Russians promise to supply us with the quantity of nickel required, but only as long as they pleased. Therefore Finland must not be interfered with any more.
Demarche of the Russians on account of our massing of troops in Roumania has taken place and will be duly rejected. Russians always become insolent at a time when they cannot be harmed (winter).
The massing of troops in Roumania serves a threefold purpose:
a. an operation against Greece
b. protection of Bulgaria against Russia and Turkey
c. safeguarding the guarantee to Roumania.
Each of these tasks requires its own group of forces, altogether therefore very strong forces whose deployment far from our base requires a long time.
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Desirable that this deployment is completed without interference from the enemy. Therefore disclose the game as late as possible. The tendency will be to cross the Danube at the last possible moment and to line up for attack at the earliest possible moment.
For this reason—as well as owing to the difficulties of transportation which came to light during yesterday's military discussions it is not advisable at present to dispatch a German unit to Albania. If it remained stationary behind the front, psychologically undesirable reactions would result: Italians in heavy fighting—Germans look on from behind the front.
However if the German unit is employed, the war in the southeast, too, will be prematurely started.
As far as can be foreseen, Turkey will remain neutral; it would be very unpleasant if she declared her solidarity with Britain and put her airfields at Britain's disposal [handwritten marginal note : —Constantinopel-Constanza: 350 km].
General situation in the East can be judged correctly only from the situation in the West. The attack against the British Isles is our ultimate aim.
In this respect, we are in the position of a man with only one round left in his rifle; if he misses, the situation is much worse than before. The landing cannot be repeated, since too much equipment would be lost in the case of a failure. Britain would then have no need to worry any more and could employ the bulk of her forces at the periphery wherever she pleases. As long as the attack has not taken place, the British must always reckon with the possibility.
A landing can only be made under certain conditions which, however, did not exist in Fall:—no three consecutive days of good weather.
Apart from that, the general task in the West is the protection of our base from Kirkenes to the Spanish frontier, at the same' time always keeping a group of forces in Southern France ready to step in if Britain should gain a foothold in Portugal.
- The blocking of the Sicily passage by the air force is only a poor substitute for the possession of Gibraltar. We had made such preparations as would have ensured success. Once in possession of Gibraltar, we would be in a position to gain a foothold with strong forces in North Africa and thus put an end to Weygand's blackmail. If therefore Italy were after all to succeed in getting France to enter the war, this would be a great success and would
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basically change the situation in the Mediterranean within a short space of time.
I don't see great danger coming from America even if she should enter the war. The much greater danger is the gigantic block of Russia. Though we have very favourable political and economic agreements with Russia, I prefer to rely on powerful means at my disposal. Very considerable parts of these are therefore tied down on the Russian frontier, thus preventing me from supplying the armament industry with sufficient manpower to bring the armament of the air force and navy to the highest possible pitch.
As long as Stalin lives, there is probably no danger; he is intelligent and careful. But should he cease to be there, the Jews, who at present only occupy second and third-rank positions might move up again into the first rank.
It therefore behoves us to be careful. The Russians are continually trying to work out new demands which they read into the agreements. That is why they do not like explicit and precise formulas in these.
It is therefore necessary to keep a constant eye on the Russian factor and to keep on guard, by means of strength and clever diplomacy. Formerly Russia would have been no danger at all; for on land she cannot imperil us in the least, but now in the era of the air force, the Roumanian oilfields can be turned into an expanse of smoking debris from Russia and from the Mediterranean, and the life of the axis depends on those oilfields.
In any case, we must not dispatch valuable units to places where they will remain inactive. Therefore we shall send to Libya not an armoured but an anti-tank unit, which can.be transported more quickly and can still be employed before the hot period sets in. For employed it shall be:—we do not want to act like the British did in France. The tanks and the anti-tank guns in this unit penetrate any British tank which is in action there.
' The troops are experienced have confidence in their weapons and are self-reliant that is very important in the fight against tanks. We.have given the name "tank-hunters" to the anti-tank gunners also for psychological reasons. They are to seek out the enemy tank and battle it like the huntsman his quarry.
General statements on the factors which are decisive for success in modern warfare. In the course of these, reference to the importance of training in up-to-date methods of warfare which requires much time and effort and a highly efficient body of noncommissioned officers.
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Importance of the air force and of the armoured warfare. The training of an armoured unit is beset with difficulties, it is least possible to form an armoured unit by improvisation. Even the conversion of a fully trained armoured unit to other weapons takes months.
We have not achieved our great successes with armoured troops by working with heavy tanks. We prefer rpedium tanks. The French had very much heavier tanks than we had.
Our greatest asset were our panzer-generals who have developed completely new tactics and have directed their units very cleverly and with an offensive spirit.
General reference to the importance of mines in land warfare. Examples:—mining of our west wall. Blockade by mines which were laid by the 16th army in the flank of our attack against France. By means of mines, a field of attack can be completely messed up.
Question of the Fuehrer about mines at Tobruk and whether further mines could not be brought in by U-boats.
Tanks lose all offensive spirit as soon as they encounter minefields. Great heroism by the engineer is required to remove or clear minefields.
Views on the war in the air and the comparison of German to British air raids.
It is necessary to have at one's disposal a mighty anti-aircraft weapon with a great ammunition supply for a moment may come when the war will be conducted almost exclusively by the air force and the navy.
Against heavily armed ships, only the dive-bomber is successful.
Fuehrer dwells on the excellent impression he has gained of General Antonescu. He really is a personality.
The Duce is of the opinion that his relations to the Legion are not good.
Fuehrer goes into generalizations on the subject of revolutions of which only the Fascist and the National Socialist ones have had an immediately constructive effect. In Roumania the predestined man was murdered before the outbreak and the first-rank leaders of the legion with him. Thus it came about that the leading man grow out of the Army, who started off the revolution and removed the king. He is inspired by glowing fanaticism, is ready for any battle for his country and will wage it with, without, or if necessary even against the Legion.
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One man must be the Fuehrer, a head of State and beside him a leader of a movement are not possible. It would be best if Antonescu became simultaneously the leader of the Legion.