Extract from the Naval War Diary, on planning for the war with the USSR, and continued operations against Britain

GERMAN NAVAL WAR DIARY 30 January 1941 [Page 401]
7. Talk by la about the plans and preparations for the "Barbarossa" case to be submitted to the High Command of Armed Forces.
I. Objectives of war against Britain, a. Main purpose of the navy consists in continued actions against Britain. Possibility of intensifying U-boat war be necessary discontinuance of submarine training in the Baltic and thereby release of part of the training ships for combat duty.
b. Importance of securing of sea lanes on the West Coast of Norway by the temporarily suspended traffic in the Baltic. Since some battle-worthy security forces are not sufficient, additional combat-units from the Western theater of operation are indispensable.
II. Objectives of war against Russia. Solution of the problem in spite of Russian superiority possibly by the sacrifice of a temporary discontinuance of our sea traffic (ore transports) in the Baltic.
a. Protection of our coast secured by presently existing or about-to-be reorganized coast artillery. Defense against enemy submarine attack by using units of submarines, pursuit ships, and mine sweepers.
b. Prevention of escape of enemy combat vessels from the Baltic secured by the defense power of our coastal batteries, by creating new mined waters, with suitable barrage and the existing big air threat.
Additional safety measures:
To get ready loaded minelayers for immediate tactical blockade and the installation of the "Schlesien" and "Schleswig-Holstein" ships as floating batteries.
Since it is not possible for the Navy to prevent the escape of smaller Russian combat vessels through the Weissmeer canal, immediate commitment of air force is required to destroy locks of this canal.
c. To declare mines in waters and to effect blockades to fortify present defensive power and to discourage operations of Russian waterborne combat units against the Western Baltic at the start of war:
(1) Danger zone "Oland" between Memel and south end of "Oland."
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(2) Danger zone "Bornholm" between Kolbergbornholm and Bornholmystadt.
(3) Danger zone at the south outlet of the Sund (renewed and enlarged).
(4) Danger zone "Gjedser Enge."
(5) Danger zone at the western outlet of the Finnish Bay (offensive blockade).
Demands to the Swedish navy to blockade Swedish waters including the Southkvarkenstreet (Aaland Sea).
d. To harrass the Russian fleet by surprise blows as :
(1) Lightninglike commitments at the outbreak of the war of air force units against strong points and combat vessels in the Baltic, Black Sea, and Ice Sea.
(2) Actions with mines (for example with E-boats) against the Baltic strong points, attack of submarines against traffic center points, attack of camouflaged minelayers from the cliffs. If opportunity arises, premature laying of delayed action mines.
(3) To make use of the fighting power of the Finnish fleet is desirable. Important support of German objectives by a surprise laying of a blockade with Finnish ships inside the Gulf of Finland. (If the opportunity arises, material support is required).
e. Protection of the sea lanes in the Ice Sea is possible, however, not so the elimination of the Russian main stronghold of Po~ larnoje-Murmansk. Here, a lightninglike attack of the air force is necessary (bombers and air mines).
/. In the Black Sea, on account of Russian superiority, limitation to coastal defense and securing the Danube and its estuaries.
For early regulation of the Rumanian and Bulgarian objectives, timely appointment of liaison officers is asked. Besides support by furnishing mines and coastal guns, the transfer of river flotillas from the Netherlands to the lower Danube is intended.'
Possibilities of preparing a minelayer for offensive purposes and air mine action are being examined.
g. In case Russia respects Swedish rights in her waters, German sea traffic in Swedish waters under convoy of Swedish war ships is aspired from North Sweden to the Kattegat.
h. Even after the elimination of the Russian Baltic Fleet, long lasting effects from the mine war, to be expected of Russia, are to be reckoned with. Since our minesweeper units are not at disposal, it is attempted to use also Finnish and Swedish combat vessels and to commit captured Russian booty ships, if the opportunity arises, with a Russian crew. The head of the naval war
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staff agrees with these proposals. They are submitted to the Armed Forces High Command per naval war staff I op 94/41. Top Military Secret, matter for Chief.