Notes in German Navy records, on the size of German battleships, comparing the actual tonnage with the lesser tonnage reported to Britain; the navy in Hitler's foreign policy; the expectation of a war with England, France, and Russia

| Translation of an extract from an unnamed, unnumbered German Navy file containing notes year by year from 1927 - 1940 on the reconstruction of the German Navy.]
O.K.M.
A - 21 - 1 Questions of Type. Shipbuilding Plan.
COPY
Berlin, 18.2.193b Copy No. 2.
M to Head of Office A
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The displacement of the battleships "Scharnhorst-Gneisenau" and "F/G" is in both cases greater than has been notified to the British.
* * * * * * *
Length. Beam Displacement by Type actual notified Draught actual notified
Scharnhorst 226.0 30.0 — 31.300 ts 26.000 ts 8.55 7.50
"F" 241.0 36.0 — 41.700 ts 35.000 ts 8.69 7.90
"HI" 254.0 41.0 — 56.200 ts 46.850 ts 9.60 8.40
or "H II" 254.0 41.0 — 56.200 ts 45.000 ts 9.60 8.15
or "H III" 254.0 41.0 — 56.200 ts 43.000 ts 9.60 7.85
*******
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In the opinion of A IV it would under no circumstances be right to notify a larger tonnage than that which for instance England, Russia or Japan will probably publish shortly, in order that we may not be held responsible for a race in armaments.
O.K.M.
Shipbuilding Plans.
BZ 221 Vol. 5 S. 5
COPY Copy No. 2
Berlin, 8.3.1938.
General Navy Office to M (Chief of Staff with request to bring to the attention of the C-in-C Navy).
BB 6207/38
Subject: Address by C in C Navy to Directors of Shipbuilding Yards.
* * * It is proposed to make a statement something after
the following style:
"In a very roughly outlined programme of new ship construction the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor has set the Navy the task of providing him by a given time with the means of power which he needs for the carrying out of his foreign policy * *
R.W.M.
A 24
— 2
Planning Committee. COPY
Copy No. 2.
Carls
Admiral and C-in-C Fleet
Tender "Hela" September 1938 Most Secret
Opinion on the "Draft Study of Naval Warfare against England". A. There is full agreement with the main theme of the study.
1. If according to the Fuehrer's decision Germany is to acquire a position as a world power she needs not only sufficient colonial possessions but also secure naval communications and secure access to the ocean.
2. Both requirements can only be fulfilled in opposition to Anglo—French interests and would limit their position as world powers. It is unlikely that they can be achieved by peaceful means. The decision to make Germany a world power therefore forces upon us the necessity of making the corresponding preparations for war.
3. War against England means at the same time war against the Empire, against France, probably against Russia as well as
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a lai'ge number of countries overseas, % of the whole world.
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in fact against y2 to
It can only be justified and have a chance of success if it is prepared economically as well as 'politically and militarily and waged with the aim of conquering for Germany an outlet to the ocean.