Extracts from interrogation of Schacht, on German rearmament, the occupation of Austria and the Sudetenland, conflicts with Goering in economic policy, the role of the plenipotentiary for war economy

Excerpts from Testimony of Dr. Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht, taken at Nürnberg, Germany, 16 October 1945, 1430-1630, by Lt. Col. Murray Gurfein, AUS, OUSCC
Questions by Colonel Gurfein to the Witness in English:
[Pages 2-9] .
Q. Yes. So that, I take it, in March 1937, you were not ip any way opposed to the further extension of the armament program except insofar as it was limited by technical reasons?
A. No. There is another reason in addition to that. I think that any overdoing of armaments contains the danger of war in itself.
Q. That is what you said last time that we talked, and I was interested in that. When did it first come to your mind that the extent of the German armament was in such a position as to cause the danger of war in itself?
A. That I can't tell you, because all restrictions and thoughts in my mind, accumulated in my mind, accumulated by and by. New points always came in, and the first time that I really thought Hitler might not be willing to avert a war by all means was in the Fritsch Affair. That changed my mind entirely.
Q. That was in February 1938?
A. May I just add a few remarks to my last interrogation?
Q. Yes.
A. When I made that statement, I didn't say what I meant. I had, of course, thought of ordinary life and none of the exceptional pressure under which I came through Hitler. When I made that statement in Vienna, I was still hopeful that I would be able to check Hitler some way or another, because the Fritsch Affair was not yet cleared. It was under trial, and the acquitting of Fritsch came only, I think somewhat later. I don't remember the date exactly, but I still hoped that Fritsch would become restituted to his post, and when that was not the case, then I said something must be wrong, because at the same time the Blomberg affair also became known to me. Some people hinted to me that that also was an intrigue, played by Himmler or somebody.
485
3728—PS
3728-PS
Q. Tell us a little more clearly, if you will, Dr. Schacht, what was there about the Fritsch affair that disturbed you?
A. Fritsch was the finest character in the whole army, in my opinion. Fritsch was certainly not willing to overdo armaments and certainly he would never have agreed to an aggressive war, so I relied entirely on him, and I was on good terms with him, and I knew that he was against any extension politics of Hitler's.
Q. But I thought we agreed last time that the attack on Austria was an aggressive one. Was that not your opinion?
A. No, we did not agree, sir. It was an aggressive one by propaganda, but not by military aggression.
Q. Just to revert to that for a moment scientifically, you recall that in your speech in Vienna you yourself said that "through the means of the German will and consciousness, and through the strength of the Wehrmacht of ours, we achieved our objectives" or something to that effect?
A. I stated at the same time in our last interrogation that this was towards the allies and not towards Austria. I have never heard of any military enemies to Austria. I have heard a good deal about propaganda, and such things.
Q. Let us review that for a moment. I don't want to get too deeply into the Austrian affair, but let us stick to matters that were of common knowledge. You know that the French asked the Italians, Mussolini, whether he would stand firm at the intervention in the independence of Austria? You remember that?
A. I don't remember the details.
Q. There was a time when Italy threatened to march sometime before, a good time before that.
A. A good time before that.
Q. There was this development with Schuschnigg being brought to Berchtesgaden, which was common knowledge.
A. Yes.
Q. And there was this whole question among the European powers as to whether this Anschluss, which was directly prohibited by treaty arrangement, would be performed. You remember that?
A. Yes.
Q. And you remember that the tension was extremely strong at the time on the question of whether France and Italy would move to maintain the integrity of Austria, the guarantee. You remember that?
A. That was long before.
48fi
" 3728—PS
Q. They guaranteed it long before, but the diplomatic statements were published at the time, were they not?
A. I think that Mussolini had this for his opposition long ago.
Q. What I am trying to say is, and I ask you, was it not the threat of armed force on the borders of Austria which preceded this Anschluss?
A. I don't think so.
Q. Was there a mobilization? Do you remember?
A. I don't know. Was there?
Q. I am just wondering what you remembered about it.
A. Yes, but that had nothing to do with Fritsch, because Fritsch was not in office.
Q. I am not talking about Fritsch now. We went off the subject as we said we would, Dr. Schacht when I said that it was parenthetical. I asked you in the first place whether after the withdrawal of Fritsch it was not an aggressive action against Austria, and I had thought that we had agreed last time that, although you said that you had no knowledge of it beforehand that, nevertheless, you still condemned Hitler's principles and so forth, and implied that the matter was an aggressive one. .
A. I would even deplore propaganda, an aggressive propaganda, inside of Austria; not only military threat.
Q. But what I mean is, do you withdraw completely what you said at Vienna, where you seemed to be pleased at the success of Hitler's method of obtaining the Anschluss?
A. Would I what?
Q. Will you read the question?
(The question referred to was read by the reporter as set forth above.)
A. I stand by that statement.
Q. Now, coming back to this question of aggression and whether or not there was a threat of armed force, do you recall that on March 11th, Austrian reservists were called up to meet the crisis? Does that come back to your memory? I am just trying to get the framework on the situation.
A. I have not been in those details at the time.
Q. Well, but you were a living man at the time. We all were, and we were very influential, as a matter of fact.
A. No. I was not influential at all, not in that.
Q. What I am trying to do is to ask you whether you remember—and if you don't, say so—whether you remember the tension that existed in Europe prior to the Anschluss.
A. Certainly. There must have been.
487
3728-PS
Q. And that tension was caused, was it not, by the poising of the armed forces of Germany on the borders of Austria ?
A. Well, I don't know that.
Q. Do you remember Hitler's speech of the 20th of February of 1938, for example?
A. No.
Q. Where he told the Reichstag that the Germans in Austria and the Sudetenland had to have self-determination?
A. No.
Q. Did you attend those sessions of the Reichstag, by the wray ? A. I don't remember.
Q. Weren't you, as a member of the government, entitled to sit on the government benches at these Reichstag meetings?
A. Yes, but I have missed very, very many meetings.
Q. Do you recall whether or not you were present?
A. That is easily verifiable.
Q. That is why I asked you.
A. No, I don't know. I don't remember.
Q. You don't remember?
A. No, I don't remember.
Q. You remember being on the Reichstag government bench at the time war was declared on Poland?
A. I certainly was not.
Q. You were not?
A. No. .
Q. I just want to ask you this, a little off the beaten track: There is testimony, Dr. Schacht, to the effect that after you left the Reichsbank and retained your position as Minister without Portfolio that you still sat on the government bench in the Reichstag. '
A. Once, sir.
Q. And when was that?
A. After Hitler came back from France.
Q. After the great victory?
A. After the great victory over France. The reason was this: The ministers were all ordered to meet Hitler at the station. I was in Berlin at that time. I couldn't escape joining them, and because I also greeted him from the station, I couldn't escape going to the Reichstag, and I did it; but I think that is the only time I attended the Reichstag after the opening of war.
Q. There weren't many sessions of. course?
488
488
3728—PS
A. Oh, there were some, for Poland, for America, for instance, for—oh, yes there were some. After Poland, yes, but I don't think I have ever attended any, except this one.
Q. That is the only one you went to, at the moment of the great victory over France?
A. It is the only one I remember.
Q. Coming back to what we were discussing, Dr. Schacht, you recall this tension in Europe, as you say, at the time of the Austrian Anschluss and you recall even at that time the Czechs were making statements, saying that they would defend themselves if attacked ?
A. (Pause)
Q. You must.
A. I have never been in these foreign politics and I don't remember what declarations and speeches were made.
Q. These were things that were in the public press.
A. I have read that as a common reader, but I wasn't very much interested in the matter.
Q. Let me ask you, then: Would you deny that there was tension in Europe and the threat of a war prior to the Austrian Anschluss?
A. I don't think that there was threat of war, not from our side.
Q. Your intentions were to take Austria, were they not? Not your personal intentions, but the intentions of the Reich?
A. I think Hitler intended to force the Anschluss.
Q. If Hitler intended to force the Anschluss, it might have tended toward a general war. That was one of the risks, was it not?
A. I don't think so.
Q. You don't think there ever was a risk?
A. No.
Q. You didn't think there was a possibility that France might have protected the integrity of Austria ?
A. If France would have done that, then I think the right moment for any military intervention was when Germany began to rearm.
Q. But again you are dealing with risks and gambles, are you not, Dr. Schacht? You are dealing with the other fellow's point of view as to what he might or might not do.
A. You asked me if I think he could have done something. Of course he could.
3728-PS
3728-PS
[Pages 17-20J
Q. But would you say that the existence of that Wehrmacht as it was then constituted, gave the means to Hitler to pursue this foreign policy of his ?
A, One of the means, yes.
Q. Now I just want to ask you, because I think you said it at the time and I am just going to see if you are still of the same opinion, because if you want to change the opinion, I'd like to get it—you made a speech I believe, to the German Academy for the Wehrwirtschaft. You had a reception on November 29, 1938, where you spoke on the theme of Finance Wonder and the New Plan. So you remember that ?
A. Yes.
Q. In that speech do you remember saying this: "With the help of its daring credit policy, Germany created for itself a strong armament and this in turn had made possible the success of our politics" ?
A. Yes, I stand by that still today.
Q. Then you went on to say: "Despite this, there was no German financial wonder. The wonder was the reawakening of the German national conscience and German discipline, and for this wonder we must thank our Fuehrer, Adolf Hitler" ?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, then, what interests me about this is that this was after the Munich agreement.
A. Yes, after the Sudeten question.
Q. And this was after the cessation of the Sudetenland ?
A. Yes.
Q. And again you are in terms opposing the appeasement of Hitler?
A. Yes.
Q. So I take it the position you take would be what? A. (Pause)
Q. The position you take is that at the time you said this publicly, you did not actually mean it, I suppose?
A. I have been satisfied with the results of the Anschluss. 1 have disproved the methods. I have certainly not objected in my mind nor openly to the Anschluss or the Sudeten Deustche, but 1 have always disapproved of the methods I have realized and stated publicly and privately that all this would not have been fulfilled unless the rearmament of Germany had taken place and changed the position of Germany towards the Allies.
490
3728—PS
Q. You realize, of course, that the Czechs had an army, and the Czechs had munition works, as well, did they not?
A. Sir, the method toward the Czechs or against the Czechs I had always disapproved of.
Q. But I am asking you, Dr. Schacht, this: You constantly speak of the Wehrmacht or the rearmament vis-a-vis the allies.
A. Yes.
Q. Now I ask you whether the fact of this strong standing army on the German side should not be measured against the Czechs ?
A. No. I would have been absolutely against that, because that was the wrong method.
Q. You mean that the army would be built up to a strength so large that the allied powers would not seek to intervene?
A. No, certainly not, but that it could be of some nuisance, if not justified internationally. Claims could be dealt with on peaceful basis of negotiations, as for instance, in '32, the customs union.
Q. Now coming back to this Sudeten problem, you had an army here that was raised to the point where you say the allies would recognize the right of Germany to negotiate with the Czechs diplomatically?
A. Yes.
Q. If Germany did not have this army, the allies would not have recognized that right?
A. I think that the fact that Germany at that time had an army—had great consequences with the allies. .
Q. In what sense?
A. Why, for instance, forbid to Germany the customs union with Austria in '32 by threatening Germany with armed force and why didn't they do it in '38 when the Anschluss was committed?
Q. You mean by 1938 Germany had created an army which was sufficiently large to take care of itself in any general conflict?
A. Sir, don't ask me these military questions. I can't answer to that. I only say that the fact that Germany was strong again and armed has altered the politics of the allies.
Q. Altered them in respect to what?
A. Their attitude toward Germany.
Q. Well, now, the Anschluss with Austria was not certainly by virtue of any international agreement, was it?
A. No, but they tolerated it.
49]
3728—PS
Q. They tolerated it because Germany was strong, is that right?
A. They had not tolerated the customs union, which would have been much wiser, because then probably Hitler would probably never have appeared on the surface.
Q. We keep coming back to the customs union. Let's put our mind to the period of 1938, this crucial period in the world history. At that time this Wehrmacht which was created was strong enough to prevent the nations from interfering with any aggressive plans that Hitler wanted to plan ?
A. I don't know. I can't say whether it was militarily strong enough. I can only say that it influenced, certainly must have influenced, the politics and the policies of the allies.
[Page 21]
Q. Let's come back to the turning. Obviously you must have had certain conflicts of conscience for quite a long time with respect to this problem.
A. Yes, certainly.
Q. And those conflicts of conscience must have been revolving themselves in your mind, I should have thought, for some years.
A. Sir, my first moral doubts about Hitler originated in '34. I have tried to make sure whether I was right in judging him that way. That can't be done from one day to another. It takes a long time, because I have seen him every few months or so, I mean. My doubts about the overdoing of the German economic and financial strength originated in the year about '36. Here, again, it took me some time to talk things over with Blomberg and Krosigk, and so on. Then I had to hope that on this field, which was my field, I was able to check him. That was why I held my position as managing man of the Ministry of Economics until the fall of '37. Then I went out, because I say I couldn't hold it against Goering.
[Pages 24-29]
Q. In November '38 in that same speech that I referred to: "At the beginning of the year, the spring of 1938 showed a change in our financing policy because German economy had finally reached the point of full employment."
A. Yes.
Q. "On the first of April 1938, the credit creations through the bank of issue were stopped and the financing of the State requirements were now put on to the way of taxes and loans."
A. Exactly what I said.
492
3728-PS
Q. Yes. So that it was clear that at that time at least it was felt that the difference in methods which you had predicted a long time before would ultimately come through the recreation of employment and so forth, and would enable a change of policy, isn't that correct?
A. But within the limits.
Q. But within the limits.
A. Within the given limits, certainly.
Q. Now the limits, however, you have always maintained, that is, the limits of armaments, you never knew.
A. No.
Q. That is what I don't know. What limits are you talking about, Dr. Schacht?
A. I doubt very much that any further armaments could have been financed unless he abused the Reichsbank. New loans could not any more be found. All that could be levied from the financial market and from the Germany economy, so that a further continuation of armaments would not have been possible.
Q. You mean that there would have been no income from loans and no income from taxes sufficient to have any armament program ?
A. Not beyond the stage reached.
Q. In your speech of November 29th, '38, you certainly did not imply that, did you?
A. I don't?
Q. I don't think so.
A. What did I say?
Q. You say here, following that? "Therefore, the only correct way was for the bank of issue at the beginning to place at the disposal the necessary credits for work and rearmament and only up to the point where the economy again developed itself into a position where a considerable condition of savings and consolidation was possible. Only from that point on should, and in fact must the financing be changed over to the financing through taxes and loans."
A. Yes, certainly. That was one of the best speeches I ever made.
Q. What I am trying to get at is that that was a position that you held back as far as 1935, was it not, that you would give credit for a limited time in order to prime the pump, as we say in America?
A. Yes.
693259—46—32
493
3728—PS
Q. And when the time came, when the economy itself, through the creation of savings, and throughout the act of business and the workers to absorb higher taxes, that at that time it would be unnecessary to either have notes printed or to have an expansion of credit through the Reichsbank, but that instead you would rely on normal budgetary and loan revenues? That was always your position ?
A. Yes. Always.
Q. So nothing changed in the interim?
A. No.
Q. That is what I am trying to get at. So that there was nothing startling in 1937 about your refusal to give Hitler any more monies from the bank, because that had always been your position?
A. Because in '37 I say already that the—
Q. That the time had come?
A. That everybody was employed,
Q. That did not mean, I ask you again, that you were then opposed to further armaments if by some magic the money could be obtained from another source?
A. Sir, the money could not be obtained from some other source, because they had to repay the mefo bills. There were lots of other things to do. We had to assume a foreign debt payment on all this.
Q. There was nothing that said that that was inevitable? A. What is that?
Q. Why did you have to resume the foreign debt payment? You had defaulted before.
A. I wanted to change the default. I wanted to become an honest debtor again.
Q. Actually, as a matter of fact, let me ask you this: At the time when you started the mefo bills, for example, there were no ready means available for financing the armament.
A. Quite.
Q. That is to say, through normal budget finance methods?
A. Not enough.
Q. Also you were limited at that time by the statute of the Reichsbank which did not permit you to give anything near the sufficient credit which was required for the armament program?
A. Quite.
Q.
A.
And yet you found a way" Yes.
494
3728—PS
Q. And the way you found was by creating a device in effect which enabled the Reichsbank to lend by a subterfuge to the government what it normally or legally could not do ?
A. Right.
Q. So I think for a resourceful man like yourself, it is difficult for me to understand how at a given moment of time in 1938, a situation had so altered itself that some way could not be found for some continuation of armaments.
A. Colonel, my impression was now it was enough.
Q. What was enough?
A. Money. Enough armaments. Enough money.
Q. I ask you again: You have always maintained that you did not know the size of the armaments. How did you know it was enough ?
A. I didn't know. It simply was my feeling.
Q. Just a feeling?
A. Yes. But I knew, for instance, that with General Thomas I was always in agreement, and he was the man of the Ruestungs-amt.
Q. Coming back to this business of your conflict of conscience that you were talking about, it finally resolved itself with respect to the Ministry of Economics in your departure from Goering in November of 1937. Now, for how long before that would you say had you begun to have substantial doubts whether you could carry on this post as Minister of Economics ?
A. After the Four Years Plan.
Q. And the Four Years Plan came in when?
A. It was announced in September '36 on the Party day.
Q. Do you say that from the time that the Four Years Plan came in in September 1936, you were already to rid yourself of your economic duty?
A. No. At that time I thought that I might maintain my position even against Goering.
Q. Yes. In what sense?
A. That he would not interfere with affairs which I had to manage in my ministry.
Q. As a matter of fact, his appointment was not met with favor by you ?
A. I would not have appointed a man like Goering who didn't understand a bit about all these things.
Q. But you had originally, I take it, suggested to Hitler that he be appointed the Commissar for raw materials and foreign exchange.
495
3728—PS
A. Not for raw materials, but for foreign exchange. That was because I had not the least authority with the Party, and the Party always deceived me in foreign exchange.
Q. But, nevertheless, you say that at the time when Goering became delegate for the Four Year Plan you were not in sympathy with the appointment?
A. No, not at all.
Q. How long did it take for you to crystallize in your mind the feeling that you could not go along with Goering and maintain your position as Minister of Economics?
A. The first moment that it happened that Goering interfered with my business I drew the consequences, and that was in July '37, when he gave out a law about mining. I don't know the details any more, but it was about the State interfering with mining, something like that. That was the end of July. This law he brought out without even informing me beforehand of any intention to do so, or without discussing the law or the method of executing the law, and immediately after that beginning of August, I wrote a long letter to him, stating my differences of opinion. This letter is somewhere; perhaps you have it. I sent a copy of that letter to the Fuehrer and asked for my resignation as Commissar for the Ministry.
Q. That was towards the end of August?
A. No. The 11th of August. I remember the date.
Q. 11th of August. But before this July incident with respect to the mining that you speak about, had there been a series of developments with Goering since 1936?
A. I have stated at some former interrogation—I don't know whether it was with you—that in the middle of December '36, Goering for the first time in his new position assembled an assembly of industrialists and outlined his ideas about German economy before them, saying several foolish things, and that on the 22nd of January the following year, five weeks later at the occasion of my birthday—that is why I remember the date—my 60th birthday, in a public speech I refuted these ideas of Goer-ing's, so that the difference of opinion between Goering and myself became already public at that time.
[Pages 34-39]
Q. Let me ask you: Did you in July 1937 have a discussion with Goering or indeed an argument with Goering about your retaining your position as Plenipotentiary for the War Economy? A. It was never mentioned.
498
3728—PS
Q. I want you to think carefully about that, Doctor.
A. It was never mentioned, because I remember that very well. When I retired as Minister of Economics, at the same time I was withdrawn as Reichsverteidungskommissar. That is what you mean.
Q. No. It was Generalbevollmaeehtigter der Kriegswirtschaft.
A. General?
Q. General Plenipotentiary for the War Economy.
A. It had been information gotten in the document which relieved me from my post as Minister of Economics, and a few days later Lammers came and said, "Now here is the other document about the Plenipotentiary." As to Goering, I have not discussed it with him. Nobody had thought about it.
Q. Now, let's go back very carefully. Set your mind on this, because it may turn out to be important. I am not talking now of the time when you resigned or was dismissed as Minister of Economics in November of 1937. I am now talking of the time when you were functioning as Minister of Economics in July 1937.
A. Yes.
Q. I ask you whether at that time before you had given up the position as Minister of Economics you did not have a dispute with Goering with respect to your maintaining or retaining the position of General Plenipotentiary for the War Economy?
A. I don't remember that I had it.
Q. Do you remember any discussion with Goering and with Hitler concerning your desire to continue in the post as Minister of the War Economy?
A. It is absolutely untrue, absolutely untrue.
Q. Did you have any discussion on that subject of any kind with Hitler or with Goering?
A. None whatever.
Q. Did you to anybody assert or maintain that you were entitled to retain the position of General Plenipotentiary for the War Economy in July or thereabout of 1937?
A. Not that I remember. None whatever, because I didn't lay any stress upon such a position.
Q. Now, let me refresh your recollection as to this point, and see if it does. Did you have a discussion with Hitler and Goering in which you pointed out that in case of war Goering would be busy with the Luftwaffe and hence probably be in the field and that, therefore, he could not run the War Economy in the event of war, and that, therefore, you had better be left in that position?
A. Not after my dismissal.
4#7
3728-PS
Q. This is before your dismissal.
A. No. Such a conversation is possible, because I had always objected to Goering's abilities of managing the Economics, and that can only have been at the time when my dismissal was not yet discussed.
Q. Your dismissal was not yet discussed?
A. Yes.
Q. But I asked you, did you urge upon the Fuehrer that you be permitted to retain the position of Plenipotentiary for the War Economy in the event of war?
A. Certainly not.
Q. That is your best recollection ?
A. My best recollection and conviction.
Q. See if this refreshes your recollection, Dr. Schacht: I just want to see if it does. This is a document that is marked Exhibit A of 15 October 1945, Edlow, and bears the date, "Berlin" 7 of July 1937. It is a copy signed "Herman Goering" and "Dr. Hjalmar Schacht," and I ask you if you will refresh your recollection from this document.
A. (Examining document) What does it mean?
Q. X am asking you. Does it refresh your recollection about the incident?
A. No. That has nothing to do with the question you have asked me.
Q. Why not?
A. What does it state?
Q. Would you mind reading it? Translate it into English for the record.
A. "At the request of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor, and examination' '—
Q. Let me read it. It may be easier for you, "At the request of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor, and examination by both undersigned of the previously presented fundamental question which is hereby resolved had resulted that the tasks of the delegates of the Four Years Plan and the tasks of the Plenipotentiary for War Economy be resolved in closest cooperation. Additional the fact is agreed to that the Plenipotentiary for War Economy has without doubt the position of the highest Reich authority." Signed "Goering" and "Schacht."
A. Yes. Now can you give me an explanation of it?
Q. You remember first signing the document?
A. Certainly. I don't remember it, but there is no question about it.
498
3728—PS
Q. All right. You remember, then, having a further discussion with Goering about the situation?
A. No. But I can absolutely now explain how it has come about.
Q. Please do.
A. After Goering had taken over the Four Years Plan, and I must say after he had taken over the control of foreign exchange already since April '36, but still more after the Four Years Plan, September '36, he has always tried to get control of the whole economic policy. One of the objects, of course, was that as Plenipotentiary for War Economy in the case of war, and he being only too anxious to get everything into his hands, he tried to get that away from me. Certainly as long as I had the position of Minister of Economics I have certainly objected to that, because after he had got the foreign exchange and after he had got the Four Years Plan, I didn't want to give away one thing after the other and then remain as nothing. Therefore, the last sentence about the Plenipotentiary, I didn't want to dwindle down, and that is all.
Q. Now, Goering's explanation of the last sentence might amuse you. He says that made it definite that you would be under his jurisdiction, because all the Obersten Behörde were under him.
A. It may amuse you if I tell you that the last conversation that I had with Goering on these topics was in November '37, when Luther for two months had endeavored to unite Goering and myself and to induce me to further cooperate with Goering and maintain my position as Minister of Economics. Then I had a last talk with Goering, and at the end of this talk Goering said, "But I must have the right to give orders to you." Then I said, "Not to me, but to my successor." I have never taken orders from Goering, and would never have done it, because he was a fool in economics, and I knew something about it, at least.
Q. Well, I gather that was a culminating, progressive, personal business between you and Goering. That seems perfectly obvious.
A. Certainly.
Q. That was the fundamental reason why you could not keep your position any more, because you would have been in a position to take orders from a man whom you did not respect in economic matters?
A. Absolutely, and this is one of the stages where he tried to take something away from me, and immediately after my dismissal, after my resignation, this was also taken.
499
3728—PS
Q. What I am trying to analyze now, if I may for a moment, is what was it that he was trying to take way from here ?
A. He wanted to become Plenipotentiary for the War Economy.
Q. Let's go into the duties of that job for a moment and see what he was trying to take away from you. There are only two possibilities as it has been explained to me. If I am wrong, correct me. One would be the preparation for a mobilization, and the other would be the actual taking charge of this in the event of war. Otherwise the post had no meaning. So the things you resisted his taking away from you, as I see it was the right to be in charge of the preparation for mobilization, and, secondly, the right to control in the event of war ?
A. Correct.
[Pages 52-54]
Q. Do you recall why you were discussing as early as 1936 this mobilization business?
A. But sir, I was, as you have stated, Plenipotentiary for War Economics, and I have considered this as a routine method for the General Staff of the War Ministry, and certainly we had discussed these methods.
Q. In other words, you didn't consider it a negative or negligible task, as I think you first said the first time I asked you about it?
A. I have never thought of any possibility of mobilization, but, nevertheless, as a routine work, you have to deal with it.
Q. That is the only explanation you have of that?
A. Certainly.
Q. Goering at those meetings from time to time would speak about the possibilities of war. Do you think that was in the same vein?
A. I don't know whether it was in the same day—
Q. Same vein, the same vein, the same ideas as yours, those remarks ?
A. I doubt it very much, because all those things were just those that made me suspicious.
Q. For instance, Goering says, "All means must be considered from the standpoint of assurance of the direction of war."
A. Yes.
Q. And you were present, of course, and you then replied to him, in which you suggested that there should be price fixing. Do you remember that?
A. I don't remember that, but certainly, it's true, if it is in there.
500
Q. So that, I take it, you actually did occupy this position that you were named to, as Plenipotentiary for the War Economy?
A. Certainly.
Q. And just as the Chief of the General Staff worries in advance about preparations in the event of mobilization from the military point of view, so you were concerned with it from the economic point of view ?
A. Certainly.
Q. I think that is all for today, Dr. Schacht. I will probably see you tomorrow or the next day.