Extracts from diary on Japan's expectation of a war with the United States and a united German-Italian-Japanese front, Mussolini's enthusiasm, Germany's initial caution, and reactions to Japan's attack on the United States (3-8 December 1941)

[Entries in the Diary of Count Galeazzo Ciano] Introduction [Para. 5]
But the alliance [between Germany and Italy] had one clause according to which, for a period of three to four years, neither Italy nor Germany would raise questions likdly to disturb order in Europe. However in the summer of '39 Germany advanced her claims against Poland, naturally without our knowledge; indeed, Ribbentrop had several times denied to our Ambassador that Germany had any intention of carrying the controversy to extremes. Despite these denials I remained unconvinced; I wanted to make sure for myself, and on August 111 went to Salzburg. It was in his residence at Fuschl that Ribbentrop informed me, while we were waiting to go to eat, of the decision to start the fireworks, just as he might have told me about the most unimportant and commonplace administrative matter. "Well, Ribbentrop," I asked him while we were walking in the garden, "What do you want? The Corridor or Danzig?" "Not any longer"—and he fixed on me those cold Musee Grevin eyes of his —"We want war."
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January 20 and 21, 1941 [Mussolini and Ciano are visiting Hitler
and Ribbentrop at Obersalzberg]
Mussolini says he brought him up to date on Italian affairs and talked to him about the unenthusiastic but not actively antagonistic attitude of the King, and finally told him of the Badoglio affair, which Hitler compared to the Frisch affair. The Duce is
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pleased with the conversation on the whole. I am less pleased, particularly as Ribbentrop, who had always been so boastful in the past, told me, when I asked him outright how long the war would last, that he saw no possibility of it ending before 1942. And what will happen to us?
There were many other conversations, the most important of which took place Monday with the military leaders. Hitler spoke for some two hours about his forthcoming intervention in Greece; the entire question was presented from a technical point of view as part of the general political picture. I must say that he is a
past master at this. Our military men were much impressed * * *
On the whole, results of the visit are good. There is complete solidarity between the two countries and we will act together in the Balkans * * *
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August 11, 1939
I have collected in the conference records verbal transcripts of my conversations with Ribbentrop and Hitler. Here I shall only note some impressions of a general nature. Ribbentrop is evasive every time I ask him for particulars of the forthcoming German action. He has a guilty conscience. He has lied too many times about German intentions towards Poland not to feel embarrassment now over what he must tell me and what he is preparing to do. '
The will to fight is unalterable. He rejects any solution which might satisfy Germany and prevent the struggle. I am certain that even if the Germans were given everything they demanded, they would attack just the same, because they are possessed by the demon of destruction.
Our conversation sometimes takes a dramatic turn. I do not hesitate to speak my mind in the most brutal manner. But this doesn't shake him in the least. I realize how little weight this view carries in German opinion.
The atmosphere is icy. And the cold feeling between us is reflected in our followers. During dinner we do not exchange a word. We distrust each other. But I at least have a clear conscience. He has not.
August 12, 1939
Hitler is very cordial, but he, too, is adamant and relentless in his decision. He speaks standing in the large drawing room of his house, in front of a table on which some maps are spread. He displays a thorough knowledge of military affairs. He speaks
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with great calm and becomes excited only when he advises as to deliver the coup de grace to Yugoslavia as soon as possible.
I soon realize that there is nothing more to be done. Our arguments cannot serve to check him in the slightest. He keeps repeating that he will localize the conflict with Poland, but his affirmation that the great war must be fought while he and the Duce are still young leads me to believe that he is once again speaking in bad faith.
He has words of high praise for the Duce but listens in a disinterested and impersonal manner when I tell him of the trouble which a war will bring upon the Italian people. Fundamentally I feel that the alliance with us is useful to the Germans only for the number of forces we can divert from their fronts; nothing more. Our fate doesn't interest them. They know that the war will be decided by them, not by us. And at the end, they promise us a gift of charity.
August 13, 1939
The second talk with Hitler is shorter, and I would say more concise. Even in his manner the man reveals more than he did yesterday his desire for immediate action. The parting is cordial, but reserved on both sides.
At the Palazzo Venezia I report to the Duce * * *
The Duce's reactions are mixed. At first he agrees with me. Then he says that honor forces him to march with Germany. Finally, he admits that he wants his share of the booty in Croatia and Dalmatia.
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December 3, 1941 Wednesday
Sensational move by Japan. The Ambassador asks for an audience with the Duce and reads him a long statement on the progress of the negotiations with America, concluding with the assertion that they have reached a dead end. Then, invoking the appropriate clause in the Tripartite Pact, he asks that Italy declare war on America immediately after the outbreak of hostilities and proposes the signature of an agreement not to conclude a separate peace. The interpreter translating this request was trembling like a leaf. The Duce gave fullest assurances, reserving the right to confer with Berlin before giving a reply. The Duce was pleased with the communication and said: "We are now on the brink of the intercontinental war which I predicted as early as September 1939." What does this new event
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mean? In any case, it means that Roosevelt has succeeded in his maneuver. Since he could not enter into the war immediately and directly, he has entered it indirectly by letting himself be attacked by Japan. Furthermore, this event also means that every prospect of peace is becoming further and further removed, and that it is now easy—much too easy—to predict a long war. Who will be able to hold out longest? It is on this basis that the problem must be considered. Berlin's answer will be somewhat delayed, because Hitler has gone to the southern front to see General Kleist, whose armies continue to give way under the pressure of an unexpected Soviet offensive.
December 4, 1941 Thursday
Berlin's reaction to the Japanese move is extremely cautious. Perhaps they will accept because they cannot get out of it, but the idea of provoking America's intervention pleases the Germans less and less. Mussolini, on the other hand, is pleased about it.
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December 5, 1941 Friday
A night interrupted by Ribbentrop's restlessness. After delaying two days, now he cannot wait a minute to answer the Japanese and at three in the morning he sent Mackensen to my house to submit a plan for a triple agreement relative to Japanese intervention and the pledge not to make a separate peace. He wanted me to awaken the Duce, but I did not do so, and the latter was very glad I hadn't * * * -
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December 8, 1941 Monday
A night telephone call from Ribbentrop; he is overjoyed about the Japanese attack on America. He is so happy about it that I am happy with him, though I am not too sure about the final advantages of what has happened. One thing is now certain: that America will enter the conflict, and that the conflict will be so long that she will be able to realize all her potential force. This morning I told this to the King who had been pleased about the event. He ended by admitting that in the "long run" I may be right. Mussolini was happy too. „ For a long time he has favored a definite clarification of relations between America and the Axis * * *
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