Record of a meeting bewteen Hitler and Czech president Hacha, on conflicts within Czechoslovakia and relations with Germany, Germany's military occupation, and Czech national autonomy under German control

Conference between the Fuehrer and Chancellor of the Reich and the President of the Czechoslovak State Hacha in the presence of Reich Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and of the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Chvalkowsky in the Reich-Chancery on the 15th March 1939, 1.15-2.15 a.m.
There were also present:
Field Marshall [Generalfeldmarschall] Goering General Keitel
State Secretary [Staatssekretaer] Weizsacker Minister of State Meissner State Secretary Dietrich Counsellor [Legationsrat] Hewel State President Hacha greets the Fuehrer and expresses his thanks for being received by him. For a long time he had been desirous of meeting the man whose wonderful ideas he had often read and followed. (Every one sits down.)
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Hacha: He was an unknown person until recently. He had never dabbled in politics. He had been just a judicial official in the Viennese civil service, and as such he had deliberately taken no part in politics in order to be unbiased toward the Parties, with which he had to deal as a judge. In 1918 he had been called to Prague, and in 1925 was appointed president of the Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Supreme Court for Administrative Law). In this capacity he had had no relations with the politicians or, as he preferred to say, with the so-called politicians [Politikastern], and it was only rarely that he had come into contact with them. He must mention at the outset that he had also had hardly any relations with the Government and that he had confined his intercourse with the members of the Government to the minimum. He had never been persona grata. He used to meet President Ma-saryk only once a year at a dinner of the judges. Benes [he met] even less frequently. The only time he had met the latter misunderstandings had occurred. For the rest the whole regime had been alien to him, in fact, so much so that immediately after the sudden change [Umschwung] he had asked himself whether it was really a good thing for Czechoslovakia to be an independent state. This autumn the task had been allotted to him of becoming head of the state. He was an old man. He had overcome his doubts when it was shown him that it was his patriotic duty to take over the office. By accepting it the most difficult task of his life had fallen on him, and, therefore, he had dared to ask the Fuehrer to receive him.
He was convinced that the fate of Czechoslovakia lay in the hands of the Fuehrer, and he believed that her fate was safe in the Fuehrer's hands. He had no grounds for complaint over what had happened in Slovakia recently. He had been convinced for a long time that it was impossible for the various peoples to live together in this [single] body politic. Although their languages resembled each other to a certain extent, they had developed along very different lines. Czechoslovakia was more closely related to Germany than to Slovakia, which showed a stronger inclination towards the Magyars. The Czechs had maintained relations only with the Evangelical [Protestant] Slovaks, whilst the Catholic Slovaks had been rejected by the Czechs. These were the reasons why a good understanding could never be achieved, and he was glad that the development had followed this path. He was not alone in holding this view, but was sure that 80 per cent of the population shared it with him.
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Half an hour ago he had received reports that the Carpatho-Ukraine had proclaimed its independence. He was of the opinion that the Fuehrer's experiences with regard to the Slovaks would be none too good. During these last few days rumours about a violation of the constitution in Prague had doubtless reached the Fuehrer's ears. This breach of the constitution would probably be laid to- his (Hacha's) charge. But being a lawyer he knew that the dismissal of the government had been based on sound legal foundations. Moreover, the constitution itself had not been respected by part of the Czech government. Unfortunately incidents had occurred in this connection which he regretted; they had, however, taken place as a consequence of measures connected with the maintenance of order. These incidents had not been intended. Otherwise he did not shed any tears over Slovakia.
Now he came to the point which concerned him most, the fate of his people. He believed that the Fuehrer, especially, would understand him when he expressed his opinion that Czechoslovakia had the right to wish to live her own national life. Naturally, the geographical position of Czechoslovakia made the existence of the friendliest terms with Germany necessary. This must be the foundation of a distinct national life. The greater part of the Czech people shared this conviction. There were, of course, some exceptions, but the fact that the hew Czechoslovakia had only been in existence for six months had to be kept in mind. The charge had been made that there were still many followers of the Benes system in Czechoslovakia.. But the persons who were named are not the ones. This system only had friends in journalistic circles. The government with all the means at its disposal was resolved to reduce them to silence. This was practically all he wanted to say.
The Fuehrer answered and expressed his regret for having had to ask the President to undertake this journey. This morning, however, after careful consideration he had reached the conclusion that, in spite of the advanced age of the President, this journey might prove of great service to his country, since Germany's attack was only a matter of hours. The'German Reich had, in principle, no animosity against any other nations. Nations which do not wrong us are dear to us, or at the least uninteresting to us. The German people harbour no hatred against Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia,, however, had adopted an entirely different attitude towards us. The Fuehrer quoted several occasions when, during great political events, this attitude had manifested itself, e. g., during the occupation of the Rhineland.
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Czechoslovakia had then sent a memorandum to France declaring that, if that country would take military measures against Germany Czechoslovakia would be prepared to assist her. Czechoslovakia had done this in spite of the fact that the territory in question was purely German. The same attitude was shown by her on many other occasions, e.g., against Italy during the Abyssinian conflict, etc. The situation had become unbearable by 1938. On May 28th, therefore, he had decided to face the consequences. He had no animosity against any nation, but he was the most ruthless defender of the rights of his own people, and in that struggle he was determined to take any step. In this regard he would be the frontline soldier who stands and fights for his conviction, ruthlessly and without any scruples. For the rest the existence of the remainder of Czechoslovakia was only due to his loyal attitude. At the risk of incurring the hostility of a friendly Hungary he had stopped her political ambitions and had forced her to solve the problem, like Germany, only according to ethnographical principles, although the craziest situation, both [from the point of view] of economics and of customs duties, resulted from it. He had accepted these restrictions not because he could not have acted differently, but because he was convinced that this was the correct way. For the other countries Czechoslovakia had been merely a means to an end. London and Paris had shown themselves in no position to do anything for Czechoslovakia.
t Slovakia was a matter of complete indifference to him. Had Slovakia established closer connections with Germany, this would have been a commitment for Germany, and he was, therefore, glad not to be under any obligation now. East of the Lower Carpathian Mountains he had no interest at all. Last autumn he had not wanted to push things to an extreme because he then still thought it possible to live together. At that time, and also later on in his discussion with Chvalkowsky, he did not leave any doubt that he would ruthlessly break up this state unless the Benes tendencies disappeared altogether. Chvalkowsky had then understood this, and had asked the Fuehrer to be patient. The Fuehrer agreed, but months elapsed without any change being brought about. The new regime did not succeed in uprooting the old one psychologically. This could be seen from the press, the whispering propaganda, the dismissal of Germans, and from many other facts symbolical to him of the whole situation. At first he had not realized this, but when he became fully aware of it, he had definitely drawn his conclusions since, if matters continued to develop in this way, the [German] situation towards Czechoslovakia
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would have become the same as it had been 6 months ago. Why did Czechoslovakia not immediately reduce her army to a reasonable strength? Such an army represented an enormous burden to such a State, since its only significance was to support *the State's foreign policy. Czechoslovakia's foreign policy, however, had no longer a mission to fulfill so that there was no point in retaining such an army. He quoted several instances which had shown him that the spirit of the army had not changed. From this particular symptom he gained the conviction that for the future the army would be a serious liability in a political respect. In addition, there was the inevitable development arising from economic necessity and, furthermore, the .protests of the national groups, who could no longer endure such a life. '
"Last Sunday, therefore, for me the die was cast. I summoned the Hungarian envoy and notified him that I was going to with-* draw my [restraining] hands from this country." Now we were facing this pact. He had issued the order for German troops to march into Czechoslovakia, and to incorporate this country into the German Reich. He intended to grant Czechoslovakia the fullest autonomy and a distinct life, more than she had ever enjoyed under the Austrian regime. Germany's attitude towards Czechoslovakia would be defined tomorrow and the day after, and would be dependent on the behaviour shown by the Czech people and army towards the German troops. He had no longer confidence in the Government. Though believing in Hacha's and Chvalkow-sky's sincerity and honesty, he doubted whether the Government would be able to exert an effective control over the whole population. To-day the German army was already marching, and resistance offered at one barracks had been ruthlessly crushed whilst another was said to have given in when the heavy artillery was ordered out.
This morning at 6 a. m. the German Army would invade Czechoslovakia at all points, and the German Air Force would occupy all Czech airports. There were two possibilities. The first was that the invasion of the German troops might develop into a battle. This resistance would then be broken down by force of arms with all available means. The other was that the entry of the German troops should take place in a peaceable manner, and then it would be easy for the Fuehrer, in the course of the new development of Czech life, to give to Czechoslovakia an individual existence on a generous scale, autonomy and a certain amount of national freedom. "
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We were living, at this moment, through a great turning-point in history. He did not wish to torment or to denationalize the Czechs. He was doing all this, not out of hate, but in order to protect Germany. If, in the autumn of the preceding year, Czechoslovakia had not yielded, the Czech people would have been utterly destroyed. Nobody could have prevented him from doing it then. It was his will that the Czech people should develop on their own national lines, and he believed firmly that a form for this could be found, in which it would be possible to meet, to a great extent, Czech wishes. If, tomorrow, it came to a fight, any pressure would produpe counter-pressure, and it would no longer be possible for him to give the promised alleviations. In two days the Czech army would cease to exist. Some Germans would, of course, also be killed, and this would produce a feeling of hatred which would compel him, from motives of self-preservation, to refuse any 'longer to grant autonomy. The world would not care a. jot about this. He felt sorry for the Czech people when he read the foreign press. It gave him the sort of impression expressed by the German proverb: "The Moor has done his duty, the Moor may go."
That was the state of affairs. There were two courses open to Germany: a stern one offering no concessions and, bearing the past in mind, desiring that Czechoslovakia should be crushed with bloodshed; and the other in accordance with his proposals stated above. '
That was the reason why he had asked Hacha to come here. This invitation was the last good deed he would be able to render to the Czech people. If it came to fighting, then the bloodshed would compel us to hate also. But perhaps Hacha's visit might avert the worst. Perhaps he would contribute to the finding of a plan which would be much more far-reaching for Czechoslovakia than any they could ever have hoped for in the old Austrian Empire. His sole aim was to procure the essential security for the German nation.
The hours were passing. At 6 o'clock the troops would march in. He felt almost ashamed to say that, for every Czech battalion, a German division would come. The military operation was not a trifling one, but had been planned on a most generous scale. He would advise him to withdraw now with Chvalkowsky in order to discuss what should be done.
Hacha says that the situation is completely clear to him and that any resistance to this would be foolish. But he would ask the Fuehrer how it could be arranged, within four hours, to hold
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back the entire Czech nation from offering resistance. The Fuehrer says that he is at liberty to consult his advisers [Herren]. The military machine now in motion cannot be stopped. He should appeal to his authorities in Prague. It might be a great decision, but he could see the possibility dawning of a long period of peace between the two nations. Should the decision be otherwise, he could foresee the annihilation of Czechoslovakia.
Hacha asks whether the whole purpose of the invasion is to disarm the Czech army. This might, perhaps, be done in some other way.
The Fuehrer says that his decision is irrevocable. Everyone knows what a decision by the Fuehrer means. He could see no other practical method of disarmament, and asks the others present whether they agree with him, which they confirm. The only possibility of disarming the Czech army would be by the German army.
For Hacha the path he was taking today was the most difficult in his life, but he believed that in a few years' time this decision would be regarded as understandable and in 50 years probably as a fortunate one.
At this point both Czechs withdraw.
After the discussion between Hacha and Chvalkowsky and our representatives, at the conclusion of which the wording of the agreement had been settled, the representatives mentioned at the beginning of the report meet again for a concluding discussion in the Fuehrer's study. The military position is reviewed fully again, and the Field Marshal [Goering] gives a detailed description of the situation. The Fuehrer considers that possibly here and there Hacha's message might not have gotten through and this might lead to clashes, but by and large one might count upon an entry without opposition.
The Fuehrer goes on to say that he believes that, in spite of any bitterness that might be caused by the entry and occupation by the German Reich, the conviction will slowly dawn of the benefit to be derived from a century-long common life of the two nations. The idea that the two peoples were compelled to fight one another would disappear. Czechoslovakia was an integral part of the German Reich, and every reasonable person must admit that closest co-operation must be the watchword. In addition, the problem of de-nationalization is of no significance as this is quite remote from the German people themselves and also from the National-Socialist ideology. We do not desire nor do we intend de-nationalization. They, on one hand, shall live as Czechs,
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and we wish to live contentedly as Germans. The German Reich could be enormously magnanimous in this sphere. .
Hacha replies that this statement of the Fuehrer's is of the greatest importance to him.
The Fuehrer continues that only in the economic, military and political spheres could we brook no opposition. Czechia should keep her own Head of State, and his principles, which he would put into force, would form the basis for the appeasement of this area for centuries to come. ,
Hacha interjects that, in other words, there is no "soul buying" on the programme, as there had been during the Austrian period, and asks whether in the economic sphere a customs union is planned.
The first point the Fuehrer denied with a smile. The Field Marshal answers the second question in the affirmative, saying that Germany and Czechoslovakia were one economic unit. In addition, Czechoslovakia would get orders which would certainly double her production.
The Fuehrer says that the Czechoslovak people would gain economically from the annexation to Germany, since it would participate in the Greater German economic sphere. He did not wish to destroy the Czech economy, but to enliven it tremendously.
Hacha asks if any definite directives to this effect have already been laid down.
The Fuehrer replies that.this question is one for an Economic Commission, because for him, also, the whole thing came as a surprise. A few weeks ago he knew nothing of the whole affair. He referred once again to the past and to Benes' tactics, and finally mentioned May 28th, the date on which he confided his decision to take action to a small circle.
The Fuehrer concludes with the remarks that the settlement now formulated must be final, supportable and unequivocal. In any case, the Czechs would obtain more rights than they had ever granted to the Germans in their territory.
Thereupon the Agreement was signed by the Fuehrer, the Reich Foreign Minister, Hacha ancl Chvalkowsky.
[Signed] HEWEL
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