A. Yes, there was the opportunity for the defendant to ask the defense counsel to supply this witnesses information at the trial -- to write to him that on a certain day, certain hour he should appear before the court, if he had been appointed as a witness for the defense counsel or by the defendant. It then happened that sufficient witnesses were then brought along by the defense counsel.
Q. Did the defendant Cuhorst make frequent speeches during the time that he occupied the president of the bench at Stuttgart?
A. If I understand your question correctly I am supposed to testify as to whether Cuhorst outside of his official activities gave speeches?
Q. Yes, I mean when he was not on the bench. Just this one question: Did he make speeches other than from the bench?
A. Of course.
Q. Were these speeches that he made in public places on legal or judicial matters or were they on other matters?
A. Herr Cuhorst had been appointed Gau speaker for the territory, Gau lecturer, and he was used especially during certain campaigns for special reasons. He was Gau lecturer partly in Stuttgart end in the country, and in the little towns he was used as such, and he delivered speeches repeatedly in Stuttgart. They were not speeches which concerned themselves about legal matters, but they were political speeches. The subject matter for all these Gau speakers and Kreis speakers had been ordered by the party. These public gatherings had been published and announced, and the subject of the lecturer had also been announced.
Q. Did you have occasion during this time that you acted, in your various capacities as the prosecution's side, to see how criminal crimes were prepared and filed in districts other than in Stuttgart?
A I saw rather few of these indictments, perhaps once in a while an indictment from Munich or Frankfurt. On the whole, however, of such political indictments I saw only those of the prosecution at the People' Court, because the Chief Reich Public Prosecutor at the People's Court frequently transferred trials to the General Public Prosecutor in Stuttgart. On the occasion of such trials, indictments and sentences of the People's Court had to be used also in conducting such trials repeatedly; that is, they had to be referred to.
Q From your observation of these other indictments filed before special courts and those that you saw that had been filed in the People' Court, tell the Court whether there was any noticeable difference between those and those that you prepared for trial before Cuhorst.
A Yes, I noticed particularly that the indictments were often surprisingly brief. They often described the facts in the case only very scantily, while the indictments of the prosecution in Stuttgard as a rule were very exhaustive. The indictments of the prosecution at the People's Court were also very exhaustive; they went into a lot of detail. All of the officers where the documents were filed had been named, and all file references were given. During my activity at the General Public Prosecutor's Office, certain directives were given for the writing of our own indictments, and they were very extensive.
Q Do you have any explanation of the reason why the indictments which you prepared for trials before the defendant Cuhorst were so extensive, as compared with these others?
AAs far as I know, one point of view was important here, namely, the point of view that we prosecutors knew that Cuhorst almost exclusively held his trial on the basis of the indictment, or based his trial on the indictment. Therefore, he desired that the indicements should, as far as possible, contain all the points of view and all the circumstances which were necessary to be known for the conduct of the trial. Regardless of this, it was probably also in accordance with our Schwaebisch manner to be somewhat more extensive, to go more into de tail, and to be somewhat more exact than, for example, the Prussian prosecutors were in the habit of being.
Q You have seen the defendant Cuhorst conduct trials, you said. Did he conduct them ordinarily from the indictment?
A Yes, I had the impression that Herr Cuhorst, as I have already told you, almost exclusively based the conduct of his trial on the indictment. Unfortunately, I also had the impression that his knowledge of the files was often not adequate, so that the Berichterstatter, the official in charge of the case who knew the files very well, had to balance the steps taken by the presiding judge.
Q Doctor, was the indictment sworn to by the prosecutor or by anyone?
A No, that was not the case. In the indictment there were the contents of the files or of the documents in so far as it was necessary for the trial, but a swearing to it never occurred. Also, the testimony of the witnesses, the transcripts, were not taken under oath or as an affidavit. An oath was taken only if a witness was examined by a commissioned judge because he was living at some distance, or because he was sick. If he was examined at another place, then, because the transcript replaced his personal appearance, the witness' statements were taken as an affidavit.
Q Under the law prevailing at the time and as practiced in the courts over which the defendant Cuhorst presided, was the defendant required to testify?
A The defendant was examined by Mr. Cuhorst himself. That was the task of the presiding judge according to our code of legal procedure. The examination of the defendant was exclusively carried on by the presiding judge, and nobody else had the right to address any questions to the defendant unless the presiding judge permitted the person concerned--that is, the associate judge or the prosecutor, possibly--to address questions to the defendant.
Q Let me get one thing clear for myself and the Court. What would have happened had a witness declined to testify, or a defendant, rather, declined to testify?
Was he required, under German law, to testify?
A Of course, according to German law the witness had to testify, only he could refuse to answer such questions which might bring about the fact that he himself would be put on trial. The testimony of a witness could be forced by a so-called forced arrest, an Erzwingungshaft.
Q Were you present at the trial of the case of Schmitt before Dr. Cuhorst?
Q Was that before Dr. Cuhorst?
Q Do you remember about the year or the time?
A Yes, it was about the year 1943; perhaps at the end of 1542, but probably in 1943.
Q Will you, just very briefly, tell the Court the facts as briefly as you can? I don't want to go into it extensively.
A In the case of this Schmitt we were concerned with a post office apprentice who worked at the field post office in Stuttgard. He was a man of about 60 or 61 years of age. He admitted that during his work at the field post office, during the course of about one--quarter of a year, he had robbed about thirty to fifty field post packages altogether, and he was, above all, interested in cigarettes.
The indictment against this man--who, as far as I remember, had been punished before because of begging--the indictment was based on the so-called Public Enemy Decree.
Actually, there was a case of theft simultaneously with the breaking open of something that had been secured against officially. However, it was supposed that Schmitt had exploited the extraordinary conditions created by the war.
Q What was the sentence, Doctor?
A The sentence was the death sentence, which was based on what could be handed down on the basis of this public Enemy Decree.
Q Did you recommend clemency in that case in your position as clemency officer?
A Yes. I was the clemency plea expert, I was in charge of that, and I was there during the trial with the general public prosecutor. As far as I remember, I told the general public prosecutor that the personal and human conditions in the case would justify not executing the death sentence. It was my opinion that after the death sentence had been pronounced, the deterring effect of the sentence was sufficient and it would not be necessary to execute the sentence in addition.
Q Dr. Schwarz, do you remember who the defense counsel was?
A The defense counsel was Diessem, the attorney at law. I remember his name exactly and this case so well because on the occasion of the defense plea of Diessem an incident occurred. The defense counsel, after some time, was interrupted by Cuhorst. That was done for the reason that his statements did not seem to be in order for Dr. Cuhorst. The defense counsel, as he stated himself, made efforts to avert the death sentence which had been asked for by the prosecutor, and for that purpose he stated that the basic crime of the deed was a trifle, actually, because only a constant violation was within the meaning of Paragraph 73, No. 5 of the Penal Code. That is, the so-called Luxury Goods Theft.
This violation is punishable with a money penalty of 350 marks or an arrest of four to five weeks. It is not actually a theft.
Q. The dispute, then, between the Defendant Cuhorst and Dr. Diessem was over the interpretation of the law, was it not?
A. Diessem did not think this was a crime within the meaning of the Public Enemy decree. He only wanted to point out that the basis of this crime was a rather scanty fact. I my opinion, Herr Diessem, legally, went a little far in his statement, and I base this on the point of view that there was no violation according to 370.5; but continued theft, in addition to that violation, was somewhat different.
Today, I have to admit that it was the right of defense counsel to do everything he could in order to represent a case from a legal point of view in the most favorable manner possible for the defendant.
MR. LaFOLLETTE: If your Honor please, I have only about two more questions on this point, I think. I would like to finish.
Q. I did not mean to interrupt, but may I ask you now who Dr. Glueck was?
A. Dr. Glueck was the president of the lawyer's chamber in Stuttgard. He was a lawyer, and at the same time, Gau Legal Office Chief of the Nazi Party.
Q. Did he have the power to discipline lawyers for breaches of legal conduct?
A. Yes. It was as follows: If a lawyer had become guilty of any kind of legal crime, so to speak, there could be a trial before the Honor Court. The other way was that the President of the lawyers' chamber based on his legal right of supervision over the lawyers, issued a corresponding decree. It consisted, for example, of a warning. I do not know whether the President of the lawyer's chamber was also in a position to ask for a fine. I think that is possible.
Q. May I ask, did. the Defendant Cuhorst report Dr. Diessem to Glueck about the dispute over the law?
A. It is correct that Herr Cuhorst, after this trial, addressed the Justizrat and the President of the Lawyers' Chamber and filed this complaint about the behavior of the lawyer Diessem.
As a result of this complaint, Herr Glueck forbade Diessem to be a defense counsel before the Special Court, and before the People's Senate and before the Oberlandesgericht in the future. I, myself, reported this incident to the General Public Prosecutor. I asked him, however, not to make it an Honor trial procedure because as far as I knew the conditions, the Lawyers at that time, were reprimanded very severely from Berlin if they made any remarks, whatsoever, in statements, which were not desirable. Generalstaatsanwalt Wagner agreed with my suggestion. I will admit openly that it would have bean unpleasant for me if I had had to appear in this case against Dr Diessem and be, so to say, the denouncer. Moreover, I wanted to prevent this case from becoming known in Berlin because in this case, I was afraid for Deissem. I was afraid that very severe measures would be taken against him. I am quite sure that an order would have directed that Honor Court procedure be used. The danger that Diessem would be deprived of his permission or right to proactive as a lawyer existed. Also Justizrat Glueck was anxious to have such cases settled here. He did not want these cases to reach Berlin.
Q. Just this, the only thing that you knew that Diessem did for which he was reported was to have this argument with the Defendant Cuhorst as to what law was applicable to the Schmitt case? Is that right?
A. Of course. Otherwise, Diessem made several remarks which made Cuhorst angry. Among other things, he said that the entire behavior of this man, Schmitt, was not a criminal behavior, but rather an untidy manner of a man who is an adict of nicotine, and who cannot control his desires. He used a colloquial expression, although this matter was serious and they asked for a death sentence. He said the defendant should be slapped on the face. At was a Schwaebisch expression, but it infuriated Cuhorst. I, myself, for that reason, considered the statement of counsel doubtful because I knew, you only create opposition that way.
It does not help your clients at all. On the contrary, it harms your clients.
Q. There is just one thing more. I think the translation came through a little erroneously a minute ago. This law that you cited was 370.5, was it not?
A. 370. This paragraph was called the so-called "mouth robbery" paragraph. It includes not only the stealing of goods, but luxury goods, especially cigarettes and everything else, that was in these postal packages.
MR. LAFOLLETTE: I think we extended the court's time to recess some. I appreciate Your Honor's letting me finish that.
THE PRESIDENT: You are through with your direct examination?
MR. LAFOLLETTE: I will renew the direct examination.
THE PRESIDENT: We will recess for 15 minutes at this time.
THE MARSHALL: The Tribunal is in recess for 15 minutes.
(A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
DR. BRIEGER: With the kind permission of Mr. LaFollette, I would like at this moment to correct a mis-translation committed by a translator who otherwise is very good. The witness said, "Dr. Diessem made a remark which provoked Cuhorst." That was translated, "Dr. Diessem made a remark that made Cuhorst angry." That translation does not express that in effect there was a cause where Cuhorst should have become irritable; in other words, that there was a casual connection. The translation should say that Diessem made a remark which irritated Cuhorst, or one could say that "provoked" Cuhorst. The translator has already told no that I am right in saying so.
MR. LA FOLLETTE: I certainly have no objection to the record appearing so. I would like at this time to divert completely to another matter so that the record may be corrected. It has been called to my attention that in the transcript of March 26, 1947 during the examinartion of testimony of the witness Seiler, that the witness Seiler identified and referred to the defendant Rothaug; whereas, the transcript on Pages 1040 to 1044 in each instance erroneously stated the defendant Rothenberger. This is clearly an error and I hope that notice will be taken of it and the transcript corrected.
BY MR. LaFOLLETTE:
Q. Witness, I believe you stated that Cuhorst, the defendant, set the cases for trial himself; is that correct?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. And that he also would set three or four cases in which severe penalties could be given for trial on the same date.
A. Well, I cannot remember individual cases, but I don't think it is impossible that several serious cases were tried on the same day for trial under Cuhorst; he attached importance not to spend much time on one case.
Q. Was it his purpose, or practice, to conduct his trials speedily so that he could finish the cases which were set for that day; is that correct?
Q. Under those circumstances, what was his attitude or his action toward defense counsel who made arguments or interposed motions on behalf of their defendants?
A. Well, it happened that Cuhorst declined to listen to motions for evidence and that he rather went ahead with things quickly, rather than to deal with lengthy legal decisions.
Q. Now, I will ask you, do you remember the case of Heinz Niemis?
A. Yes, I do. The case of Heinz Niemis, I was not at the trial, but I saw a copy of the verdict of the Special Court. Cuhorst was the presiding judge at the trial, and I saw a verdict, a copy of the verdict at the office of the General Staatsanwalt and I had to examine it and I had to add my remarks to this verdict, and then submit it to the Oberlandesgerichts President Kuestner.
Q. Did you add your remarks to that verdict in your own handwriting?
A. Yes, I did. The case was as this: Heinz Niemis, as far as I remember, was a young man of about twenty years; he was of Italian origin at Kracherwaldstrasse in Stuttgart; he had been called in to do some repair after houses had been bombed out. In the course of this repair work, he committed four or five thefts; and in two of the thefts they were of little importance; one I believe was all he stole was a piece of cheese; the most serious offense he had taken several objects, the value of about one hundred marks; those objects included a wristwatch, and sugar, etc.
Q. Do you know what the prosecution asked for in that case as the maximum penalty?
A. The prosecution demanded in the case of Niemis, for an offense against the public enemy law a penitentiary term, a sentence of four years, from three to four years; that is to say pass the sentence of three to four years; that was in accordance with the remarks entered on the indictment which had been submitted to the Reich Ministry of Justice. The prosecution had asked for four years' Penitentiary in accordance with those remarks on the indictment.
Q. What was the sentence?
A. The verdict passed was for five years in the penitentiary because of an offense against the public enemy law, and because that had been a repeat offense. Niemis had several previous convictions of a small and unimportant nature, but that meant that he had committed a repeat offense.
Q. Now, these offenses were committed largely in the area Kracherwaldstrasses in Stuttgart; is that right?
Q. Who was the prosecutor who prosecuted the case?
A. I don't know the prosecutor and one can't tell from the indictment or from the verdict who was the public prosecutor. The fact that the act was committed in those bombed buildings in Kraeherwaldstrasse indicates to me that the circumstances in passing the sentence in which the Special Court exceeded the demands of the prosecutor by one year, that was important.
Q. What did you write on the verdict?
A. I knew that Cuhorst lived in Stuttgart and the Kraeherwaldstrasse was in the same district as the Gauss-Strasse; I wrote on the verdict demands of the prosecution, four years. I knew that from a notification from the expert who dealt with the case, and I added Special Court added one year because of the part of Stuttgart where the offense was committed was in the same district where the presiding judge lives, I would like to add that I reported on this remark to the Oberlandesgerichts president Kuestner and I told them that I thought it probable that the verdict would exceed by one year the demands of the prosecution because the offense had in fact been committed in the residential district where Cuhorst lived and because by exceeding the demands of the prosecution wished to demonstrate that concerning thefts in his own district, he would take particularly severe measures.
Q. Now, let me remind you of the case Alp, and Kraeutle which was tried at Ulm; do you remember that case?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Now, Kraiutle and Alp were sentenced to death, and then the Ministry of Justice refused to uphold the sentences at the insistence of Beisitzer; isn't that right?
A. Yes, that is correct. Kraeutle and Alp were pardoned, as far as I remember, to ten years and eight years penitentiary respectively.
Q. Cuhorst had sentenced them to death?
A. The two were sentenced to death at Ulm because of offenses against the public enemy law. They had worked in warehouses and had stolen objects from the Ulm station; and, as far as I remember, in accordance with the motion by--
MR. LaFOLLETTE: The English translation is not coming through. Would you repeat; we were interrupted because the earphones were not working.
A. Because the case between the fixing of the date and the actual date of the trial only a very short period elapsed; I believe only two days elapsed in fact, but I can't remember exactly. The defense counsel either never saw the files at all or had them only for such a short time that he hardly had an opportunity to inform himself on the case and to discuss it with his client.
Q. Were you going to continue? I didn't mean to interrupt you; do you have any more to say?
A. These circumstances, that is to say, that the defense in a manner which I considered in admissible had displayed in their way these circumstances which had caused the senior public prosecutor Wendling, who was at that time the expert under the general public prosecutor, they caused him, those circumstances caused him to work towards getting a pardon for the two defendants.
I only obtained information about this case through the files because the decision on the pardon from the Reich Ministry of Justice was received by me at my office at a time when the senior public prosecutor Wendling had already left end taken up a position as chief public prosecutor at Ravensburg.
Q. Now, this other question. Do you know that Cuhorst had a suitcase stolen from him on the way to or from the Ukraine?
A. Yes. People were talking about it and were saying that on the way a suitcase her been stolen from Cuhorst, and that Cuhorst had said that from now on he would adopt particularly severe measures toward railway workers; whether that verdict was a practical effect of this statement, I cannot say, but I considered it possible.
Q. Kraeutle and Alp were railway workers, were they not?
A. They worked in the railroad warehouse; they had done so for several years. I said already that the case was dealt with by Wendling who worked extremely energetically for a pardon because he believed that the verdict should not have been passed under these circumstances.
Q. Thank you. Now, do you remember the case of a young Pole who was sentenced to death by Cuhorst for having had intercourse with a considerably older German woman, and that in that case the Ministry of Justice set the verdict aside, set the sentence aside and ordered a sentence of imprisonment?
A. Yes, I remember such a case but I am no longer in such a position to give any particulars about that case. As far as I remember the man concerned was a very young Pole who had had an affair with a very much older German woman. The Pole, if I remember correctly, was tried with Cuhorst as the presiding Judge and was sentenced to death. I assume the fact that the basis for the sentence was the law concern Poles. The peculiar feature of this case, if I remember correctly, was that it was the German woman who persuaded the young Pole to start sexual relations with her and that must have been the reason why attempt was made to achieve a pardon for the Pole and it must have also been the reason the Reich Ministry of Justice did pardon the Pole, a thing, which after all, was not a very unusual thing.
Q. Have you heard the defendant Cuhorst in his conduct of the trial against Poles and other foreigners express his opinion or legal rights, if any, or how they should be treated when they appeared in Courts before him?
A. Well, Cuhorst said and expressed generally that foreigners in Germany had to keep to the German laws particularly and if they infringed the German laws they would receive particular severe punishment.
Q. We are turning to a subject that we had gone over some but I believe that I recall that you said definitely that Cuhorst conducted his trials solely on the basis of the unsworn indictment which stressed the points; is that correct?
JUDGE BRAND: Mr. Prosecutor, I made a note of that matter. I wonder if you would clarify it for us what you mean by acting on the basis of the indictment? I call attention to the distinction between acting on the indictment as being the charge against the defendant on tho one hand or as being evidence of guilt on the other. That matter wasn't clear to us.
MR. LA FOLLETTE: In the conduct of the trial as you observed it did Cuhorst confine his questions of the witness to the matters which were set out in the unsworn indictment -- rather, the defendant?
A. Yes, that's correct. The indictment which, after all, contained everything that he made the basis for the examination of the defendant and of the witnesses and then he left it to the associate judges on the basis of their knowledge of the files to put further questions.
Q. Now, what happened if a defendant refuted statements which were allowed to have been made by him or which are allowed to have been made by other witnesses as they were set out in the indictment?
A. In such cases Cuhorst put it to the witnesses that formerly they gave different testimony. Very often he said so in a very rude manner and if necessary the Police officials or the judge of the local court, who had first examined the defendant was heard and the judge of the local court was then questioned as to whether the witness or the defendant had, in effect, made those statements or not and these statements of the officials had to be sworn to by the official.
Q. Now, was the defendant in the trial under those circumstances permitted to obtain any witnesses to testify in support of any position which he took contrary to that set out in the facts stated in the indictment ?
A. Certainly the defendant had that liberty. It was the duty of the defense counsel to see to it that such witnesses were brought in. Either the defense counsel asked that these witnesses should be called or he, himself, brought the witnesses along with him to the courtroom. If such witnesses were present usually they were examined.
Q The defendant or his counsel were required to obtain these witnesses themselves, were they not?
A. Not necessarily so. They merely had the possibility concerning the witness who had not been summoned by the Court or who, because of the shortage of the time, had not been summoned. They only had the job to summon them but it happened quite frequently that the indictment itself mentioned such witnesses which the defendant, after the defense counsel had made a corresponding notion at the pre-trial and then such witnesses were called in the sane way in which the witnesses for the prosecution were called.
MR. LAFOLLETTE: Thank you. That's all that I have.
THE PRESIDENT: Defense counsel may cross examine.
CROSS EXAMINATION BY DR. MANDRY:
Q. Dr. Mandry for the defendant Cuhorst.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you tell us how you spell your name?
DR. MANDRY: M-a-n-d-r-y- Witness, you said that the fixing of the dates of trials was exclusively a matter to be decided by the presiding Judge Cuhorst at the Special Court or at the Penal Senate?
A. Yes. As far as I remember that was so. Apart from the Second Penal Senate where President of the Senate Kiefer, naturally fixed his own date.
Q. Did that lie within the competence and the code of procedure?
A. I am not informed on the details of the procedure but I would think that the presiding judge of the Special Court was entitled to fix the date because he is the responsible authority in charge of the organization. It is my impression that sometimes he was a little too domineering in his procedure and that he frequently considered the other judges hardly at all. I occasionally heard complaints on that point.
Q. It has been put to you that occasionally three or four cases were fixed, for the same day. Is that manner of fixing cases to be heard -- was that made necessary because of the number of cases that had to be dealt with?
A. I said already in my testimony that the Special Court would have to deal with a large number of cases because all serious cases of the whole Land -- at any rate, from 1938 to 1939 -- that is to say, mainly during the war, were dealt with by the Special Court and also because often many cases of offenses against the malicious acts law had to be dealt with.
That is to say, far more cases had to be dealt with by the Special Court than had to be dealt with by any Court in the Land and that made it necessary often to deal with several cases, even with cases which were of importance in one and the same day.
Did the competence of the Special Court include the duties of tho Worrttemberg Penal Chamber and all of the jury courts?
A. Yes, the Special Court of Stuttgart was competent for the whole area of the District Court of Appeals Stuttgart. That district included the whole Land of Wurttemberg and included the Land of Hohenzollern. The competence of the penal Senate during the war was extended beyond the area of the Oberlandsgericht including Baden, Paletinate and the Saar area. As far as I know that was done because of the exigencies of the war. The Special Court itself always only dealt with the area of Wurrttemberg and Hohenzollern.
Q. At the end were the serious offenses when committed in other Wurrttemberg Court Districts -- were all of then finally dealt with by the Special Court ? Was it so that the indictment on these cases could come before the Special Court?
A. That's correct. The competence of the Special Court was, in part, compulsory. It was laid down in the law. For example, the Special Court alone was competent to deal with cases under the law against violent criminals under which it tried cases for listening to foreign radio stations and also for those under the Malicious Act Law and also for cases of offenses committed by violent criminals and also for cases than came under the Car-trap Provisions. In part, I believe, it was also competent for cases of undermining the defensive strength until later on the Oberlandesgerich dealt with cases of undermining the defensive strength. Apart from this compulsory competence of the Special Court, there was a provision in the Compulsory Regulations that the Peoples Court could bring before the Special Court any case which on account of the gravity of the offense or because of the consequence or because of the particular significance for the security of the county or for any other reason, required that the case should be dealt with speedily.
Crimes against the war economy, too, were exclusively tho sphere of the Special court. If it is possible, concerning cases of a lesser gravity at hand from the local court it went over to the Penal Chamber but this was hardly ever done because the penal chamber lacked the necessary experience which the Special Court had gained because so many cases, particularly during the years of the war there was hardly a case of any special importance which was not tried and sentenced at the Special Court. That is true, whether it was a murder case which a District Court at Ravensburg, Ulm or Heilbrann could have tried or whether it was a case of the sexual offense of rape or whether it was a case of an offense against the public enemies and of particular gravity *s, for example, the Alp-Kraoutle case, which we mentioned earlier or whether it was a case which in some other way because of the manner in which it was committed, had drawn particular attention toward it. All of these cases were concentrated at the Special Court and that at the instructions of the Reich Ministry of Justice.
Q. Did the speedy trial and also the short space left before the trial -- was that done because of such instructions or were there any instructions against doing it?
The speedy trial for the Special Court was a reason for the institution of the Special Court and in various decrees and orders from the Reich Ministry of Justice that it was intended to point out that the Special Court should deal with cases speedily. I remember an order issued in 1935 and I remember the competency order and the Special Court order itself, which concerned the summoning -- the time allowed for summoning was reduced to 24 hours. In an order -- I believe it was issued in 1940, it also said that in cases where the offender was found committing the act or where otherwise there was no doubt of his guilt an immediate sentence was possible. In 1942 the so-called Speeding-up Decree -- the Decree for the speeding-up of trials was issued which ordered that indictment, summon, and verdict should be worded as briefly as possible so that thereby the proceedings could be speeded-up but on the other hand that these tendencies toward speeding-up the trial were exaggerated for in a serious case it seems to me considerably more important to examine the case thoroughly and to prepare it thoroughly and competently.